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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper briefly discusses the corporate governance and directors’ remuneration as being 
practiced by five different ASEAN countries i.e. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Thailand. Governance is about how an entity is being directed and controlled, while corporate 
governance is about a system, procedure or mechanism of balancing between directing and 
controlling business entities’ internal matters and the demand of their external shareholders and 
stakeholders. The paper summarizes the development of corporate governance and directors’ 
remuneration in these countries. An attempt has also been made to highlight issues regarding the 
need of disclosure of individual director’s remuneration, the need of shareholders’ approval on 
directors’ remuneration, the need of shareholders’ approval on stock based incentive plan, 
approval of directors’ remuneration by a committee at board level, the separation of role of the 
Chairmen of Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officers, and the recommended maximum 
length of period offered to directors. It later focuses on the progress made by these countries in 
further uplifting their corporate governance practices. The paper also examines some arising 
pertinent and puts forth some recommendations on how the future direction of the development of 
corporate governance in ASEAN countries with respect to directors’ remuneration shall take 
shape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate governance is one of the contemporary and controversial areas in business environment. It used 
to be considered as an exclusive discussion among accounting practitioners and audit communities, 
however, currently it is becoming more important across knowledge disciplines as well as in real 
business world. Corporate governance has received a great deal of public attention due to its evident importance for 
the economic and financial health of corporations and society in general. The cases like Enron, WorldCom, 
Adelphia, Parmalat and other high profile scandals, which happened during the last decade, have also attracted the 
attention of various groups of people towards the importance of corporate governance. In ASEAN countries 
especially, corporate governance received more attention after the financial crisis of 1997, which badly hit several 
countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Philippine, and Malaysia. Accepting that some of the factors that aggravated the 
situation were external in nature, the authorities have taken great initiatives to improve the internal situation 
particularly corporate governance in local economic sectors. Greater emphasis was laid on transforming the local 
financial institutions, equity market and corporate board leadership to make them more resilient, transparent, ethical 
and credible entities.  
 
In general, corporate governance can be defined as the rules and incentives by which the management of a 
company is directed and controlled to maximize the profitability and long-term value of the firm for shareholders 
while taking into account the interests of other legitimate stakeholders (Stone, Hurley and Khemani, 1998). The 
C 
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principal players in corporate governance are the shareholders, management and the board of the directors. Other 
stakeholders include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, regulators, the environmentalists and 
the community at large. Some of the corporate governance issues, which have taken a center stage and are becoming 
popular research topics among the scholars, lie in of the rights and treatment of shareholders especially the minority 
shareholders, the responsibility of board members, financial disclosure and transparency, the role of independent and 
non independent directors, the impact of corporate governance on a firm’s performance, and the disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration. 
 
Directors’ remuneration is the payment made for services or employment of directors on the board the 
company or corporation. This includes the basic salary and other monetary or non-monetary benefits that an 
executive receives during his or her tenure. Generally boards of directors’ are categorized into two different 
categories, that is, executive and non-executive directors. Executive directors are regarded as non-independent 
directors since they are assigned specific operating roles within the entities such as finance, administration and 
operation. Non-executive directors meanwhile are regarded as independent directors since they are not directly 
involved operating function. Instead they are given tasks to monitor the executive directors such as chairing 
remuneration committee, audit committee and nomination committee within the board’s purview. Directors’ 
remuneration should be embraced in the corporate governance process. The way in which it is handled can have a 
damaging impact on a company’s reputation, and on the overall morale of the company employees. The level and 
make-up of remuneration should be sufficient to attract and retain the directors needed to run the company 
successfully.  
 
Company management has brought about significant changes in directors’ remuneration because of the 
convergence of a number of factors that necessitated re-examination of the structure and make-up of remuneration. 
The convergence factors are continuing trend towards greater transparency, accountability and linkage between pay 
and performance, changes in the accounting and tax treatment of stock based compensation, and increasing 
accountability of the board of directors for corporate governance and sustainable value creation.  
 
There are many types of directors’ remuneration or benefit plans, which are designed to help compensate 
executives and encourage them to remain with the company for long. One of them is nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan. A nonqualified deferred compensation plan lets company to set aside funds to benefit a selected 
group of highly compensated executives. It allows the company to design a deferred compensation plan for 
executive pretax salary deferral, employer contribution or both. Executive bonus plan is also one of them. An 
executive bonus plan is a way to compensate selected directors, regardless of their income and position, by paying a 
cash bonus or by directly purchasing an investment on directors’ behalf. The bonus is a tax-deductible expense to 
the company and taxable compensation for the directors. Besides, directors may be offered executive life insurance, 
which is to protect their families in the event of premature death. 
 
Some performance incentives come from ownership of the company’s shares, while the relationship 
between share ownership and firm’s performance was dependent on the level of ownership. For example, increase in 
ownership above 20 percent causes management to become more entrenched, and less interested in the welfare of 
their shareholders. Firm performance is positively associated with share option plans. These plans direct executives’ 
energies and extend their decision horizon toward the long-term, rather than the short-term, performance of the 
company. However, the point of view came under substantial criticism in the wake of various security scandals 
including mutual fund and option grants. 
 
LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
 
The link between corporate governance and directors’ remuneration can first be explained by the agency 
theory. Agency theory refers to the relationship between management and shareholders, in which management acts 
as agent for shareholders’ best interest. The management (agent) is required to operate the business mainly for the 
best interest of shareholders (principal). According to Fama and Jensen (1983) agency theory, although individual 
members of the business team act in their own self-interest, the well being of each individual depends on the well-
being of the other team members and on the performance of the team in competing with other teams. 
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The agency relationship arising from the separation of ownership from management is sometimes 
characterized as agency problem. Conflict of interest may arise. One of the reasons is executives receive their 
salaries, bonuses and stock option in a different form from shareholders who receive dividends and capital gains. 
Therefore, the management tends to use their authority to pay themselves excessive salaries and benefits. They will 
decide to retain profits rather than paying out as dividends in order to reduce the financial risk. Besides, 
management and shareholders have different attitude for risk avoidance as the results of the operation may influence 
their pay, for example around diversification activities. 
 
The management will only do their best to improve the financial performance of their company when the 
pay is often related to the size or profitability of the company. As a consequence, shareholders tend to exercise 
control and influence the behaviors of the executives by designing incentive schemes for directors with an attempt to 
align the interests of shareholders and directors.  First, directors will be rewarded financially for maximizing 
shareholders interest. Conversely, when there is no value created for shareholder there will be no reward for them, 
except the basic salary and benefits. Such schemes may include plans whereby senior executives obtain shares, 
perhaps at a reduced price, thus aligning financial interest of directors with those of shareholders. Other similar 
schemes tie levels of bonuses and compensation of the executives to shareholders returns. Part of directors’ 
compensation is deferred to the future to reward long-run value maximization of the company and deter short-run 
executive action, which harms corporate value.  
 
The remuneration committee is established at board level for recommending to the board a remuneration 
framework for executives. They are having the objective to provide the remuneration packages, which are able to 
attract, retain and motivate directors to manage the business in the interest of shareholders and to align the interest of 
both the parties. Statutory requirements in some countries require all the listed companies to publish a director’s 
remuneration report with their annual financial statement. Public listed company has to comply with the rules, 
regulations and best practices. The company is required to list down long-term incentives as well as wages received 
by directors individually. This will enhance transparency. Stock exchange regulations also require listed companies 
to have full remuneration disclosures and policies for executives. This will decrease the risk of excessive 
remuneration. The aim is to protect the shareholders and potential investors. Trust and fairness are important 
elements that must exist in the issue of directors’ remuneration. The procedures and systems in the company require 
showing that trust exists between shareholders and executives and a company is running with a reasonable standard 
of fairness. 
 
DISCLOSURE OF INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
 
According to Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, the annual report shall disclose the remuneration 
of each director. The disclosure requirement recognizes and promotes important principles of fairness and 
accountability. The principle also implies that the report should be in the name of the board, rather than of the 
remuneration committee. According to Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange), App. 9C (12), annual report of the companies are required to have a statement of how the 
companies have applied the principles set out in Part 1 of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) to 
their particular circumstances. They are required to have disclosure on director’s remuneration, which includes the 
level and make-up of remuneration and the procedure. Besides, companies are required to disclose aggregated figure 
of remuneration of executives with categorization, including executives’ fees, salaries, bonuses, commissions, 
compensation for loss of office, benefits in kind based on an estimated money value distinguishing between 
independent and non independent directors, and the number of directors whose remuneration falls in each successive 
band of RM 50, 000. However, disclosure of directors’ remuneration is not mandatory.  
 
Stated in Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, each company is to clearly disclose its remuneration 
framework, policy, level and mix of remuneration in the company’s annual report. It enables shareholders or 
investors to understand the link between remuneration paid to executives, and company’s performance. Each 
directors name and amount of payment is disclosed in bands of S$250,000 plus a breakdown (in percentage terms) 
of each director’s remuneration earned through basic/fixed salary, variable or performance-related income/bonuses, 
benefits in kind, and stock options granted and other long-term incentives. These requirements are further extended 
to the company’s top five executives. Further, the remuneration of employees who are immediate family members 
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of directors or Chief Executive Officers, and whose remuneration exceeds S$150,000 during the year shall also be 
reported. The code also requires the disclosure of comprehensive employees share schemes. “According to 
Thailand’s The Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 2006’ issued by The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand the company shall disclose fully in the company’s annual report the reward paid to directors. 
Besides the company shall also disclose the directors’ and top executive’s remuneration policies that relate to the 
contributions and responsibilities of each person. The disclosure includes the form and the amount of payment. 
Meanwhile, if the director of the company also sits as director in subsidiary companies, the amount representing the 
director’s fee paid by those subsidiaries shall also be reported.   
 
Even though, the Indonesian Accounting Standards Board (DASK) is not developing the accounting 
standard to regulate the disclosure of executive remuneration in companies’ financial statement, the Indonesian 
Code of Corporate Governance urges them to do so. It is in fact, in line with the Ministry of Government Enterprise 
instruction to all government enterprises to implement good corporate governance practices. The Jakarta Stock 
Exchange has also obliged public listed companies to implement the same good governance practices. The 
Indonesian corporate governance framework ensures that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to material information on (1) the financial and operating 
results of the company, (2) company objectives, (3) major share ownership and voting rights, (4) members of the 
board and key executive management and their remuneration, (5) material foreseeable risk factors, (6) material 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders and (7) governance structure and policies. The disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration is one of the disclosures of material information in the corporate governance framework in 
Indonesia. The reason is, as key executives in the corporation, their decisions affect the financial status and the 
shareholders wealth. In addition, the shareholders know the actual amount of money spent on the executives, and 
allow them to evaluate whether their performance is worth that much amount of remuneration. Besides, the code 
encourages the disclosure of each executive’s remuneration.  
 
The Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a principal player in imposing good 
corporate governance practices in the country. It has issued the Memorandum Circular 2, Series of 2002 also known 
as the Code of Corporate Governance under resolution No. 135 dated April 4, 2002 (Baltazar, 2002).  The code now 
is effective and must be followed under pain of penalty. The Philippine code requires the disclosure of more 
transparent internal workings of the company and cash flows. Therefore, the disclosure of individual director 
including stock option is required and becoming vital and dominant theme in the code. In addition, the code 
perceives that this information is material and will influence the cash flows of company.  The transparent internal 
works and cash flow including the directors’ remuneration can avoid the misappropriation and mismanagement of 
the company’s assets. Besides, the Philippine’s companies shall promulgate and adopt the corporate governance 
rules and principles stated in the code. Any company, which fails to adopt a manual of governance in the code shall 
be penalized P100, 000 after due notice and hearing.  
 
IS SHAREHOLDERS’ APPROVAL REQUIRED FOR DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION? 
 
In Malaysia, Under Table A: Articles of Association in Schedule Four of the Companies Act, directors’ 
remuneration is subject to shareholders’ approval; however no definition is provided by the Act as to what constitute 
remuneration. Companies are free to adopt the Table A as their company articles or make amendments to it before 
adoption. In practice however, most companies only table directors’ fees at the shareholders’ annual general meeting 
for their approval as required by Bursa Malaysia Listing requirement Under Para 7.26.  The practice is also similar 
in Singapore. 
 
According to Corporate Governance Center of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, remuneration committee is 
responsible for setting the transparent criteria and the form of payment to directors and top executives and 
presenting the recommendation to the board. Whilst the board approves top executives’ remuneration, the 
shareholders vote to approve that of directors. The board of directors shall not approve its own remuneration. The 
level and composition of remuneration should be appropriate and high enough to keep qualified directors but they 
should not be overpaid.   
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In Indonesia, the national corporate governance code, which was issued on April 2001 by National 
Committee on Corporate Governance (NCCG), states that the rights of shareholders shall be protected and they shall 
exercise their rights by relying on the appropriate procedures that have been adopted by the companies concerned 
and these procedures shall be required under applicable regulations having the force of law. One of the 
responsibilities of shareholders with respect to the above question is the appointment of the members of the Dewan 
Komisaris (board of commissioners) and the Direksi (board of managing directors) of the company and their 
remuneration. At the general meeting, shareholders have the right to appoint the members of those boards and 
determine the board members’ remuneration. In short, the code states that the shareholders are entitled to vote for 
the directors’ remuneration in Indonesia.  
 
The Philippine code states the six rights of shareholders which include the voting right, pre-emptive right, 
power of inspection, right to information, right to dividends and appraisal right. Thus, right number six of 
shareholders in the code states that the shareholders are entitled to vote for the remuneration of the directors. The 
code also allows the shareholders to vote for additional benefits, compensation and deduction of appraisal to 
directors. 
 
IS SHAREHOLDERS’ APPROVAL REQUIRED FOR STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE PLANS? 
 
The code of Malaysia is silent on the above issue. Normal practice is that the remuneration committee 
recommends such incentives for executive directors and top executives before being approved by the board. 
However, given ownership concentration in Malaysia and elsewhere in Asia, shareholders’ basic rights will not 
sufficiently address minority shareholders’ protection concerns and their fair treatment. Investor’s confidence in the 
fact that the capital they provide will be protected from misuse or misappropriation by controlling shareholders, 
managers and directors is an important factor in capital markets. Malaysia has a number of provisions designed to 
curb abusive behavior by interested, related or connected parties, which range from provisions requiring shareholder 
approval upon disclosure to absolute prohibitions in some cases. In recent years, many Singapore companies have 
adopted employee share option schemes (ESOS) as a means of compensating executives, directors and employees 
(Mak and Ching, 2000). However, most companies only issue options to senior executives and directors, although 
there have been several recent instances of the adoption of broad-based ESOS that include stock options for lower 
level employees also. Stock options can be an effective tool for aligning the interest of managers or employees and 
shareholders and provide a stronger link between pay and performance, and therefore perform an important 
corporate governance function. However, providing proper incentives through options requires a well – designed 
ESOS.  
 
Preventing abuse in the use of options requires transparency in the determination of option to rules in the 
Singapore Exchange (SGC) Listing Requirements (Practice Note No. 9h) and the Companies Act 1990. The Act, 
Section 201, requires the number and class of shares for which options are issued, date of expiration of the options, 
and basis upon which the options may be exercised to be disclosed in the directors’ report. The maximum expiration 
term of options is 10 years. The SGX rules relate to matters such as exercise price, expiration terms, vesting periods, 
total size of the scheme, number of options issued to particular individuals, participation in ESOS, and 
administration of the ESOS. In general, options are to be issued at the market price. However, options may be issued 
at a discount of up to 20 percent provided they have a minimum vesting period of 2 years and are approved by 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their associates who are directors or employees may participate in the 
ESOS provided independent shareholders’ for each person approve them. Award of option to controlling 
shareholders, awards to employees receiving in aggregate 5 percent or more of the option, and aggregate number of 
options to be made available for grant have to be approved by independent shareholders.  
 
In Thailand, the code recognizes the rights of shareholders to participate in material corporate actions by 
requiring that shareholders meeting approve such actions in advance. These actions include increase or decrease of 
capital, transactions resulting in transfer of material assets or business of the company to another party and 
extraordinary transaction. Moreover, it requires those transactions to be approved by the shareholders by super 
majority resolution. Furthermore, Stock Exchange Commission regulations on ESOS, share offering at below 
market price, and delisting of securities provided shareholders with 5 percent or 10 percent veto rights.  
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In Indonesia, despite its limited scope in application, the new law on stock-based incentive for executives 
and employees of listed companies is a major step towards the establishment of a more comprehensive regulatory 
system for employee stock option schemes. The government systematically provides for the first time detailed 
requirements for granting shares to employees, disclosure standards, pricing mechanisms and other fundamental 
procedures for the implementation of stock option and stock-based incentive schemes for listed companies. The 
existing code of corporate governance however addresses the need of shareholders’ approval to reward stock-based 
incentives and bonus payment to directors. In Philippine, the code provided appraisal right to shareholders, which 
allows them to exercise it in case any amendment to the articles of company has the effect of changing or restricting 
the rights of any shareholders or class of shares, or of authorizing preferences in any respect superior to those 
outstanding shares of any class, or of extending or shortening the term of corporate existence. 
 
MUST A REMUNERATION COMMITTEE RECOMMEND DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION PROPOSALS? 
 
It is not necessary for remuneration committee, which normally comprises independent directors, to 
approve executive director’s remuneration proposals. It depends on the balance between the proposed reward and 
actual performance of the executive directors. Therefore, the committees must ensure that the remuneration 
requested must reflect executive directors’ contribution to the company and also make a decision by ensuring that 
any termination payments are fair to the individual and the company. In Malaysia, the function of remuneration 
committee is to recommend to the board the remuneration of the executive directors in all its forms, drawing advice 
from outside as necessary. Executive directors should not take part in deciding their own remuneration. In the 
directors’ report, the membership of the remuneration committee should appear. The remuneration committee also is 
encouraged to consist of wholly or mainly non-executive directors. The board as a whole is also responsible to 
determine the remuneration package of non-executive directors, including the Chairman of BOD. As a conclusion, 
the individuals concerned shall abstain from discussing their own reward.  
 
In Singapore, the remuneration of directors and top executives is designed and recommended by the 
remuneration committee, which comprises independent directors. The Code of Corporate Governance 2005 requires 
a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on director’s remuneration and for fixing the reward 
package of individual directors. If necessary, the remuneration committee shall also seek for expert advice inside or 
outside the company on reward of all directors. In Thailand, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) establishes the 
Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies as guidelines for all board members in corporate 
governance. Based on the code, the company should have a written and transparent policy concerning the 
remuneration of directors and top management. The code states that the committee recommends the rewards of 
executive directors to the board, before being approved by shareholders during a general meeting. The remuneration 
of directors, who are appointed to specific committees or are assigned any additional duties, shall reflect the 
responsibilities assigned by the board.  
 
In Indonesia the remuneration committee is responsible for preparing and providing recommendation in 
respect of the assessment of remuneration system, the granting of options, such as stock option, pension rights and 
redundancy and other compensation schemes for both Dewan Komisaris and Direksi members. For Philippine, one 
of the remuneration committee’s duty is to review and recommend remuneration of the directors and top corporate 
officers with an intention to achieve corporate goals or objectives. In addition, the committee evaluates the 
performance of the directors and executives in light of those corporate goals or objectives and set the remuneration 
level for them.  
 
SEPARATION OF ROLES BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BOD) AND 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) 
 
The Chairman of board of directors often plays a key role in corporate governance. He has to protect the 
shareholders’ welfare and wealth; it is his responsibility to endorse the organization’s strategy, develop directional 
policy, appoint, supervise and remunerate senior executives and to ensure accountability of the organization to its 
owners (shareholders) and authorities. CEO is the highest-ranking corporate officer, administrator, who is in charge 
of total management of a corporation. It is highly recommended that the Chairman of BOD and CEO’s role is 
separate and not held by the same individual in order to avoid conflict of interest and to promote good governance. 
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Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance clearly explains the separation of role the Chairman of BOD and CEO. It 
aims to avoid individual from unfettered powers of decision. A director who is beholden to the CEO will have 
difficulty in acting independently, at least in assessing management of a company. Where the roles are combined, 
there should be a strong independent element on the board. There shall be a public explanation about the decision to 
combine both roles.  
 
As stated in Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2005, we know that there is clear division of roles 
and responsibilities at the top of the company which is the working of the Board and the executive accountability of 
the company’s business. This existing clear roles division will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no 
one individual represents a considerable concentration of power. Therefore, the Chairman and CEO should in 
principle be separate person. It helps to enhance accountability and allows greater capacity to the board for 
independent decision-making. The delegation of roles between the Chairman and CEO is clearly established, set out 
in writing and agreed by the Board. If there is any close relationship between the Chairman and CEO, it shall be 
disclosed too. In the unlikely event, the Chairman of BOD and CEO is the same person; the code recommends the 
appointment of an independent non-executive director to be the head independent director.  
 
From the guideline of Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed Companies of Thailand, there is need to 
have separation of duties of the Chairman of BOD and CEO. The Chairman shall be an independent director and 
shall not be the same person as the CEO or managing director. In Indonesia, the code encourages such separation of 
role. However, in closely held companies, it is a general culture, that the CEO is also the Chairman of BOD. 
Specifically, one person often shares the Chairman and CEO titles while another person takes the presidency or may 
become Chief Operating Officer (COO). In Philippine, the code also recommends that the roles of the Chairman of 
BOD and CEO be separated to ensure an appropriate balance of power, increased accountability and greater capacity 
of the board for independent decision making. Furthermore, they are to ensure that their organizational and 
procedural controls are adequate and effective to ensure reliability and integrity of financial and operation 
information, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, safeguarding of assets and compliance with laws, rules, 
regulations and contracts. 
 
RECOMMENDED MAXIMUM LENGTH OF CONTRACTS FOR DIRECTORS AND TOP EXECUTIVE 
 
Generally, recommended maximum length of directors’ contracts differs among countries and companies. 
It depends on the role of directors’, the nations employment regulation and also the performance of the particular 
director especially for extension of contracts. Current best practice on the length of contract period offered to CEO 
in Malaysia is three years and indeed this is already the norm in many Malaysian businesses. When the contract 
reaches the third year then the company may renew the contract of the CEO depending on his or her actual 
performance. Meanwhile, board members are required to submit themselves for re-election at regular intervals or at 
least every three years. It is the board’s responsibility to appoint new board members and the shareholders’ 
responsibility is to re-elect them. Such re-election at regular intervals not only promotes effective boards but afford 
shareholders the opportunity to review the board members’ performance and, in turn, where necessary, replace them. 
The length of contract period of CEO or top executive in Singapore is normally two years. The code however 
encourages that there should be a fixed appointment for all executive directors and the period should not be 
extremely long or with too much removal clauses. Besides that, all board members shall be eligible for re-election. 
A description of the process for the selection and appointment of new members to the board should be disclosed. 
They shall include disclosure on the search and nomination process.  
 
In Thailand, in normal circumstances, the length of contract period of CEO is 12 months. Boards of 
director’s members are required to submit themselves for re-election at regular intervals or at least every one-year. 
In Indonesia, the employment law indicates maximum 12 months’ period of working permit for expatriate inclusive 
of foreign CEO. As the corporate governance code of the county is silent on the issue, general practice is also 12 
months. In fact, the Central Bank of Indonesia indicates the same period for head honcho of commercial banks there. 
For Philippine, the initial contract offered to top executives is 18 months and could be extended to 5 years based on 
performance. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding analysis shows several initiatives taken by selected ASEAN countries’ authorities to 
enhance the corporate governance policies and practices surrounding directors’ remuneration issue. The governance 
initiatives taken are mainly based on the agency theory concept to further minimize potential agency problem 
between the agent (executives) and the principal (shareholders). The summary of above findings is tabulated in 
Table 1 at the end of this article. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration in Selected ASEAN Countries 
Corporate Governance 
Policies and Practices 
Malaysia Singapore Thailand Indonesia Philippine 
Individual director 
remuneration disclosure 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shareholders approval 
on directors’ 
remuneration 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shareholders approval 
on stock-based incentive 
plans 
Assumed not necessary (it 
is not discussed within the 
scope of provisions 
requiring shareholders 
approval) 
Yes, and approved 
by independent 
Shareholders. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Remuneration 
committee recommends 
on directors’ 
remuneration 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Separation roles of the 
Chairman of BOD and 
CEO 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Recommended 
maximum length of 
contract 
3 years 2 years 1 years/12 
months 
1 years/12 
months 
18 months with 
possible 
extension to 5 
years 
 
 
As a way forward, good corporate governance practices continue to progress among ASEAN countries. 
The stiff competition to attract foreign investors and the rise of India and China as new world economic super 
powers continues to pressure ASEAN government to invest in proper governance. With regard to directors’ 
remuneration, ASEAN may adopt a combination of  “American” standard when it comes to disclosure and sanctions 
for non-compliance, and  “European” standard when it comes to board independence, remuneration committees and 
the separation of the roles of the Chairman of BOD and CEO (Pepper, 2006). However, the challenge is an uphill 
task. In some ASEAN corporations like family oriented enterprises, government linked companies or closely held 
entities; the good corporate governance practice remains debatable. In addition, there exists a multiple agency 
relationship within the organizational set up. For instance between the owner and the board of directors, between the 
board and the top management, between top management and middle management and so on, where in all cases, the 
former is regarded as principal and the latter as the agent (Ramli, Janor, Mohamad and Kamruddin,2006). At any 
level, there is a possibility of an agency problem to arise because both principal and agent are utility maximizers 
where there is no guarantee that the agent shall act upon to maximize the benefit (wealth) of the principal (Ramli 
and Janor, 2005).  
 
Future research shall also examine the development of corporate governance in the remaining ASEAN 
countries like Vietnam, Myanmar, Brunei, Laos and Cambodia. These countries are doing well in terms of economic 
development and catching up their five senior brothers (etc. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Philippine). Indeed, Vietnam for instance recently is beating Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand in receiving foreign 
investment. However, the corporate governance is considered at infant level. While, ASEAN authorities are making 
great efforts to improve corporate governance, good public governance is also becoming inventible. The young 
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intellectuals and aware citizens have begun scrutinizing the authorities in respect of managing taxpayers’ money, 
eradicating bribery or misuse of power among public officers, and protecting the environment. It also leaves a gap 
for potential further investigation. 
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